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At this moment in history, democracy will be furthered not by efforts to extend it 
to societies where social and economic conditions are still unfavourable, but 
rather to the deepening of democracy in societies where it has been recently 
introduced.  
(Samuel Huntington)1 
 
Introduction: The ‘inner-wave’ of the deepening of democracy and good governance 
Did Huntington pre-empt what a number of nation-states have vigorously indulged in since 
the 1990s: institutional reforms promoting decentralisation, people’s participation, and the 
like, all aimed at, inter alia, the deepening of democracy? To my mind, in certain ways he 
did, yet not quite. The ‘third wave’ of democratic transition, 2 which took under its fold 81 
countries during this period, raising the number of those nation states practicing multi-party 
elections to 140 out of a total of 200, bears testimony to this observation. However, the 
phenomenon of ‘deepening democracy’ seems to have cast a much wider net than visua lised 
by Huntington. Not only the newer but also the older democracies have been experiencing 
what could be termed an ‘inner wave’ in favour of the deepening of democracy and good 
governance in their local arenas.3 More strikingly, even the non-democratic nation states (the 
classic case being China) have made moves to foster forms of democratic participation in 
                                                 
* I am grateful for the detailed comments provided by Prof. Stuart Corbridge (Geography, LSE), Prof. John 
Harriss (DESTIN, LSE) and Dr. James Putzel (Director of the Crisis States Research Centre, LSE) on an earlier 
version of this paper. It was also presented at a Crisis States Research Centre seminar held in March 2004. I 
thank the participants of the seminar for the useful comments that I received from them. However, all errors and 
omissions are mine. 
1 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Democratic Development in the Post-Cold War’, Keynote speech at the International 
Political Science Association Roundtable, Kyoto, 1994. 
2 The term comes from Samuel P. Huntington (The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 
Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992). For a detailed review of research on this theme, see Doh 
Chull Shin, ‘On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and 
Research’, World Politics, 47:1 (1994), pp.135-170. See also, Samuel P. Huntington, ‘How Countries 
Democratize?’, Political Science Quarterly, 106:4 (1991), pp.579-616. 
3 Dillinger indicates that of 75 developing and transitional countries with population in excess of five million, all 
but twelve were engaged in the early 1990s with decentralising administrative authority to units of local 
government (William Dillinger, Decentralisation and Its Implications for Urban Service Delivery, Washington, 
DC: The World Bank, 1994). See also Harry Blair, ‘Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: 
Democratic Local Governance in Six Countries’, World Development, 28:1 (2000), pp.21-39; and James Manor, 
‘Democratisation with Inclusion: Political Reforms and People’s Empowerment at the Grassroots’, Background 
Paper Human Development Report 2003, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 2002, pp.1-
56. 
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local arenas, while maintaining non-democratic regimes at the national level. Huntington, it 
seems, underestimated the expanse and the intensity of this ‘inner wave’.  
 
The seriousness with which the different waves of democratisation of nation states have 
received attention and have been subjected to analysis as a macro-historical phenomenon 
appears wanting in the case of the ‘inner wave’. This is not to suggest that its constituent 
projects and measures have remained unstudied. On the contrary, studies abound on 
decentralisation, participation, and the like. However, in the process more generic questions 
remain inadequately formulated, let alone explored:  
a) Legitimacy crisis. Why have so many countries been experiencing dilemmas about the 
legitimacy of their prevalent forms of political representational institutions, even 
when dissimilar with each other? Why does the disenchantment with the Weberian 
model of centralist bureaucracies appear so universal, when not so long ago it was 
seen as almost a necessary and positive adjunct to democratic regimes?  
b) Timing. Why, despite dissimilar length of time of democratic functioning of different 
countries, have almost all of them experienced such dilemmas in the same historical 
epoch?; why have even the authoritarian states also encountered them in the same 
period?  
c) Directionality and Convergence. Why, despite coming from dissimilar historical, 
social and cultural, and political backgrounds, has almost every country seen the way 
out of the dilemmas through a set of broadly similar measures and practices, such as: 
new public management; public-private partnership; participatory and community-
driven measurers; decentralisation; empowered participatory governance;4 and full 
scale privatisation?  
 
It is in this context that this paper approaches a case of a recent ambitious agenda for the 
deepening of democracy and good governance (henceforth the ‘agenda’), undertaken in the 
Indian state of Madhya Pradesh (MP). Primarily the paper attempts to approach the third set 
of issues with a view to delineate a possible theory of the processes that might be driving the 
directionality and convergence of attempted solutions of dilemmas the world over; and 
explore its appeal and robustness through applying it to the case of MP. At the same time, it 
also critically engages with theories of institutional change by subjecting the MP study to an 
institutional analysis. The focus is on the micro-world of power and capture, and the paper 
demonstrates that unless the interplay of institutions with ideas and agency is seriously and 
systemically considered, institutional analysis on its own may not help to unravel the black 
box of power and capture, essential also to understand the theory of the inner wave and its 
agenda.  
 
In order to do this, the paper first attempts to draw out the core premise of the agenda’s 
theory. This is followed by a brief background to the state of MP, research themes and sites 
in order to help place the empirical base of the paper in its proper context. In the third section, 
                                                 
4 Of these, studies of ‘empowered participatory governance’ or ‘deliberative democracy’ appear to be offering 
nuanced theoretical discussions around these issues. My formulations that follow also draw inspiration from 
these. For details, see Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy Institutional Innovations in 
Empowered Participatory Governance , The Real Utopias Project IV, London: Verso, 2003; Cynthia Farrar, et 
al., ‘Experimenting with Deliberative Democracy: Effects on Policy Preferences and Social Choice’, 
presentation at the ECPR Conference, Marburg, Germany, September, 18-21, 2003. For a critique, see Mark E. 
Warren, ‘What Should We Expect fro m More Democracy?: Radically Democratic Responses to Politics’, 
Political Theory, 24:2 (1996), pp.241-270. 
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I map out the important empirical findings of the research, briefly demonstrating the 
problematic they give rise to while speaking to the core premises delineated in the 
background.  In the following section, a framework of analysis is employed comprising a set 
of layered questions structured in ascending order of their causal depth and explanatory 
scope. Through this I attempt a resolution of the problematic and discuss the results thereof. 
The paper concludes by laying out a few propositions synthesising the preceding discussions 
and analysis.  
 
A theory of the agenda 
Broadly speaking, decentralisation, public-private partnership and the like have been 
promoted under the understanding that they confer advantages of: local knowledge; 
allocation of resources more informed by local needs; greater accountability and 
responsiveness of local governments due to community oversight; and more proactive 
citizenship (this last also valued as an end in itself). Many believe these will help solve 
legitimacy crises of existing, though varying, political-representational regimes across the 
globe. At the same time, these features fit the agenda of seeking alternatives to centralist 
governance structures, which, due to remaining insurmountably plagued with the vexed 
problems of high transaction costs and consequently dysfunctional principal-agent 
relationships, were being viewed as beyond redemption. 5 Taking these into consideration, and 
informed by the insights gained from MP while studying the discourse and the practice of the 
agenda, the core premises on which the theory seems to rest can be formulated in the 
following way:  
 
a) It rests on the widely-shared belief that the development of pro-active citizenship, 
involving regular, deliberative engagement both with their representatives and 
amongst citizens themselves, and which can be realised in local arenas – as opposed 
to passive citizenship (vote your remote representative once in five years) that is 
entailed in representative, electoral democracy – offers a solution to the current crisis 
of legitimacy of state regimes, and effectiveness of governance structures. 
 
The idea of such deliberative engagement seems to assume a society in which actors are 
undifferentiated across axes of power and interests, and have broadly equal deliberative 
capacities backed by comparable levels of knowledge and information. Yet it is well known 
that such conditions are lacking in most societies, especially among the developing countries. 
The theory resolves the dilemma posed by the evident discrepancy noted above by 
postulating the following: 
 
b) Structural pressure. Appropriately crafted institutions, which create spaces for 
participation, and shape incentives so as to generate structural pressures for people 
from all social strata to begin to engage, eventually move them towards a shift in 
their perception of interests and power, and build thereby more inclusive 
participation; 
                                                 
5 For a review of the literature, see Omar Azfar, et al., Decentralisation, Governance And Public Services The 
Impact Of Institutional Arrangements: Review Of The Literature, College Park: IRIS Center, University of 
Maryland, 1999. See also: James Manor, The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralisation , Washington, 
DC: The World Bank, 1999; Richard Crook & James Manor, Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia 
and West Africa: Participation, Accountability and Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998; D. Rondinelli, et al., ‘Analyzing Decentralisation in Developing Countries: A Political-Economy 
Framework’, Development and Change, 20:1 (1989), pp.57-87. 
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c) Incentive variable. Further, such a structurally- induced people’s participation can be 
reinforced by the incentive (shaped by such institutions) that its outcomes, whether 
collective goods or individual benefits, are an improvement on what existed before. If 
collective goods can result in tangible individual benefits as well, this process can be 
additionally powerful. These would enable people to move across fault lines 
differentiating a community, the transition to democracy will be made robust, and 
‘good governance’ achieved. 
 
Do premises (b) and (c) resolve the dilemma referred to earlier? This is the central question 
with which this paper engages. 
 
I argue that not only do these prove inadequate in resolving the dilemma, but in so far as the 
theory does not explicitly recognise the wider context of existing nexus between political and 
governance institutions and its impact on the participation measures, overall it also remains 
insignificantly illuminating. Unless the institutions and their incentives that the agenda offers 
as a solution to legitimacy and governance crises are situated in this nexus, and studied 
through their interplay with this context, mediated through the role of ‘reflective and 
interpretative agency’ and of ‘ideas’ that underlie such institutions, the theoretical premises 
of the agenda remain partial and inadequate in causal explanatory power. As the theory fails 
to even incorporate such elements in its core premises, it hardly stands up to an empirical test. 
 
 
Brief background of Madhya Pradesh and the research carried out in three regions  
In addressing these issues the paper draws upon an ethnographic exploration, carried out in 
Madhya Pradesh in 2003, of three major reform programmes, driven or deeply influenced by 
these premises: decentralisation through the elected local councils, the Panchayati Raj  
Institutions (PRIs); the Education Guarantee Scheme (EGS); and the Watershed Development 
Programme. As comprehensive local governance institutions, the first had a range of 
activities under their charge, but the focus here is on the working of two nationally important 
poverty-alleviation programmes aimed at the generation of employment for the rural poor: 
the Jawahar Rojgar Yojna (JRY) and the Employment Assurance Programme (EAS)6, whose 
implementation was transferred to the PRIs from the district bureaucracy. The other two 
programmes were shaped in a public-private partnership framework, and were part of the 
‘Mission’ the State had identified for itself.  
 
The research was carried out in three districts, one in each of the major regions of the state 
(Vindhya Pradesh, Mahakoshal and Malwa). Qualitative data was collected through: 160 
detailed interviews; a number of group discussions; observation of the workings of different 
government, PRI and political offices located at several levels, including action in the homes 
of ministers, members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) and PRI representatives; 
attendance at the State Assembly session, political rallies, public meetings organised by the 
PRIs and the government; and workshops and training sessions. Further, a considerable 
amount of quantitative data on the flow of the programme resources spread over 21 blocks 
and about 200 panchayats in the three study districts, and other quantitative and qualitative 
                                                 
6The JRY: a rural employment generation programme through taking up small construction works in a 
panchayat area. The EAS: a relatively bigger rural employment programme with a guarantee of 100 days 
employment for rural labourers, also for creation of durable infrastructural assets in  rural areas (offered until 
1998-99). 
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details of their implementation, were also collected from office records. These complement 
the ethnographic investigations in a number of ways.7 
 
The state of Madhya Pradesh (MP) is located in the central region of India. It has the 
nickname of Shesh Pradesh (‘Left Over State’), as it was constituted in 1956 by merging 
various regions of the neighbouring states of Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Gujarat, with 
79 of the erstwhile princely states, the most important of them being those of Gwalior and 
Indore. Before the separation of Chhattisgarh State in 2000, MP had the largest Scheduled 
Tribe (ST) population in India and also a significant Scheduled Caste (SC) population;8 and 
even now these groups make up about 35 per cent of the total population of around 60 
million, well above the all-India average. Human development indicators are all below the 
all-India averages, though the state could claim considerable success in increasing literacy 
levels in the 1990s.  
 
The State continues to have a strongly hierarchical agrarian structure, despite some efforts at 
redistributive land reforms, due to the legacy of the princely states and the historical 
persistence of intermediary forms of land tenure. Politics are characterised by clientelism and 
the continuing dominance of the forward (upper) castes, mainly Thakurs and Brahmins.9 This 
combines with the fractured social structure of the backward and the dalit castes, who are 
divided by language and culture across the vast geographical spread of the state, to limit 
seriously the possibilities of the emergence of solidarity amongst them and of a political 
movement to seek more substantial control of state power in their interests. This may explain 
why the state has almost no history of lower caste/class political mobilisation.  
 
In this political-social terrain, there has effectively been a two-party competitive system since 
the 1960s, between the once dominant Indian National Congress (Congress (I)) and the 
Bharitya Janata Party (BJP). In 1993, Congress (I) was led to power by Digvijay Singh and 
lasted for ten years, which also witnessed a serious attempt to implement the broad approach 
of ‘empowerment’ through ‘participation’ under his leadership. In the next round in 
December 2003, the BJP won a sweeping victory, with the first female Chief Minister, Sushri 
Uma Bharathi (also the first backward caste leader) taking the reins of government.  
 
Despite strong inter-party competition between Congress (I) and BJP, which has led the two 
parties to try to maximise support from SC and ST voters, and intra-party elite competition in 
factional politics, the underlying rules of the game on which state- level politics operate have 
largely remained the same. Vertical top-down linkages and clientelism have remained in 
place, so that inter- and intra-party competition have contributed little to the political 
empowerment of the poor and powerless stratum of the society, who have been exploited as 
clients rather than enabled to assume political agency. 
 
                                                 
7 Information was also gathered from informal conversations, in the buses and trains, in roadside tea shops and 
dhabas, and from the poor rickshaw pullers in large numbers. 
8These are categories of the population constitutionally defined as being eligible for positive discrimination. 
9 In the Malwa region on the western side of MP, middle caste Patels, Patidars, and  Gujars, are the major 
landowning class. Carrying on extensive commercial cultivation, they are also very wealthy as well. While not 
as aggressive as the forward caste Thakurs and Brahmins of Vindhya and the adjoining Bundelkhand regions of 
eastern and northern parts of MP, their social relations and exploitation of the poorer sections are not 
significantly different from those of the forward castes. 
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Crafting democracy and good governance from the top-down 
The origins of reform in MP: Rajniti to Lokniti in Madhya Pradesh 
Viewed against this historical backdrop, one can hardly find anything striking in these 
institutional contexts that could have inspired confidence in their potential to push the state 
on a pro-poor reformist trajectory. Yet, under Digvijay Singh’s reformist leadership the state 
witnessed a very serious attempt to envision and implement a broad pro-poor reform agenda 
of ‘empowerment’ through ‘participation’, facilitated by decentralisation. It gave an 
impression that the state had found a way to challenge the burden of its historical regressive 
institutional arrangements. The vision of this challenge was one (in the words of an official 
presentation of the reform programme) of “a mass co-scripting of the future” and of a move 
from Rajniti (political power) to Lokniti (people’s power).  
 
However, and for the reasons noted above, Digvijay Singh’s pro-poor reforms were not 
pushed from below and they were not a response to crisis, in the way that impending 
economic crises have led many countries, including India, to embrace structural reforms. If 
anything, a sense of ‘crisis’ was constructed, in order to generate a sense of urgency and of a 
‘mission’ to pursue the reforms. This was part of an ideational process that helped to integrate 
a set of ideas and arguments around the governance agenda, shaping it into a clear and 
compelling mental map, laying out the pathways to change that the reformers wanted the 
state to follow with a sense of urgency, intensity and moral élan.  
 
Ethnographic investigations carried out at the central level of the state suggest the primacy of 
agency and ideas in explaining the origins of the project of ‘crafting’ democracy. The pivotal 
role was played by Digvijay Singh. Every respondent, even his strongest critics, conceded 
that the innovative reform polices and programmes came from Digvijay Singh, despite some 
aggressively arguing that these hardly involved genuine commitment to change and the 
progress of the state, and were basically instruments for expanding Digvijay Singh’s personal 
image and his power over the party and the government.  
 
Digvijay Singh, however, had not designed the policies. What he did was to provide the 
paradigmatic ideas that structured the reform agenda.10 These were, first, to lay out the 
guiding approach: to bring people to the centre of decision making and implementation, 
trusting in their capabilities, giving them freedom from the bureaucracy (especially the lower 
bureaucracy), and decentralising power, resources and responsibilities to their hands. Then 
the people would prove more effective ‘problem solvers’ than the government – in short, 
‘people are the solution and not the problem’. Secondly, Singh’s ideas laid out the direction 
of change, which heavily emphasised investment in capacity building amongst the masses 
(education and literacy, health, poverty reduction). This strategy was viewed as the prime 
mover for achieving the overall progress of the state, even at the expense of other sectors of 
the economy usually viewed as growth-promoting.11 The rationale was unambiguously 
articulated: given the reality in MP of vast illiteracy and poor health conditions among the 
                                                 
10 The role of ‘idea’ in institutional change requires more detailed discussion than possible here. See Albert S. 
Yee, ‘The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies’, International Organization , 50:1 (1996), pp.69-108; Jorge 
Arditi, ‘Geertz, Kuhn and the Idea of a Cultural Paradigm’, The British Journal of Sociology, 45:4 (1994),. pp. 
597-617; Peter A. Hall (ed.), The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations, Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989; Jeffrey W. Legro, ‘The Transformation of Policy Ideas’ American Journal 
of Political Science, 44:3 (2000), pp. 419-432; Paul R. Schulman, ‘The Politics of Ideational Policy’, The 
Journal of Politics, 50:2 (1988), pp.263-291. 
11 Infrastructure, power, and industrialization – the factors that, it is now generally believed, cost Digvijay Singh 
the elections of December 2003. 
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masses, what would having more roads and power mean to them unless their human 
capabilities were improved? Third, Digvijay Singh defined the politics of change: both the 
approach and the direction in essence implied serving the constituency of the poor, and 
especially the SCs and the STs.  
 
These ‘paradigmatic ideas’, however, do not make policies on their own. The formulation of 
policies requires detailed professional design. This was achieved by: (a) choosing a set of 
dedicated, capable and reform-minded bureaucrats primarily from the apex civil service of 
India, who would serve as the policy entrepreneurs; (b) structuring an organisational space, 
the Rajiv Gandhi Mission (RGM), for their unhindered and focused work around the details; 
and (c) insulating the space from the adverse impacts of the usual and dysfunctional political 
and governmental practices and culture by keeping the Mission office directly under the 
purview and leadership of the Chief Minister (CM) – securing a long tenure to the policy 
entrepreneurs and robustly supporting them to give them a sense of protection and 
confidence, enabling creative and even risky innovations in policy design; and creating a 
reform ethos around the Mission. 
 
In this process, interestingly, the basic rules regulating government working remained 
fundamentally unchanged. The ministries looked after the business allotted to them as usual, 
including health, education, and natural resource management. Yet these matters, the core 
areas of the reform agenda, were brought within the RGM in the name of providing for 
interdepartmental and inter-sectoral coordination. The resulting oversight by the CM made a 
lot of difference to the outcomes: he could get his ideas through more smoothly with the 
chosen team working directly under his leadership, rather than by operating through the usua l 
departmental structures and the ministers in command of them.  
 
This ‘institutional play’, as it may be called, had other significant implications and impacts 
too. The state level reform team faced negligible principal-agent problems. ‘Chosen’ senior 
officers (agents) worked in close consultation with the CM (the principal). Trust and 
dedication to the job were the foundations of interactions between them. The sense of 
‘chosenness’, of proximity to the aura and authority of the top leader of the state, the 
consequent sense of enhanced status and prestige, additionally reinforced by national and 
even international recognition, drove the agents in the Mission offices to do their best. In 
short, the rules of the game of governance at the centre of the state remained in essence 
unaltered, but their ‘play’ was deftly and imaginatively altered to aid the reform processes. 
 
However, such an ‘institutional play’ and the resultant final passage of the policies in MP at 
the central level were not achieved without everyday politics favourable to the reform process 
as a whole. This had three features:  
 
First, managerial politics demanded the CM grasp the intricacies and political implications of 
the policy- in-process. None of the innovative design elements that called for a bold and 
unconventional departure from the hitherto established rules of financial propriety and 
appointments (for example, the rule about ‘social audit’ that enabled the PRIs to construct a 
project worth Rs.50,000 with community approval alone, so dispensing with the need for 
technical sanction and scrutiny), came about just as a bureaucratic exercise. They were 
discussed informally with the CM, who had the difficult task not only of thinking with his 
aides about their feasibility, potential of creating a political furore, and other future 
implications, but also of taking the decision to give the go-ahead, even when the entire 
process was shrouded in uncertainty and risk.  
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Second, tactical politics required that the CM keep his political colleagues, the ministers, 
MLAs, MPs and the other party functionaries in good humour, especially because the reforms 
unquestionably, explicitly or implicitly, threatened their power bases and positions of 
authority. This demanded alleviating the anxieties of his colleagues, though without 
compromising the fundamentals of the reforms. Thus, for example, a special cell was 
constituted in the CM’s office to deal with the requests of MLA/MPs expeditiously; an 
unprecedented accessibility of the CM to his colleagues was ensured; a very warm 
interaction, gestures with a humane and personal touch, and an extraordinary capacity for 
patient listening, befriended these colleagues and blunted their criticisms; and even their 
interference in the workings of local state offices at the district and lower levels were ignored 
or not too seriously resisted.  
 
Finally, when the need arose, the politics of conviction had to be firmly played out as well. At 
times, especially when the implications of the reform policies were too stark to allow a skilful 
deflection and mitigation of colleagues’ concerns, the matter came to the fore. For example, 
the design of a comprehensive devolution of power to the PRIs, which proposed to take many 
of the programmes and resources of government away from the purview of the ministers and 
MLAs, led to a furore in, and stalling of, the meeting of the cabinet of ministers (the state’s 
highest executive body), clamouring for dilution of the provisions. That failing, a large 
delegation of MLAs was engineered to put heavy collective pressure on the CM. Yielding to 
such pressure would have implied losing the agenda altogether, hence tactical politics were 
not enough to deal with this opposition anymore. An unwavering stand had to be taken, and. 
this is exactly what the CM did during that critical juncture. Failing in placating the MLAs, 
the CM announced that he would go ahead with the policy in question, as it was a matter of 
his personal conviction with which he could not compromise; and if his colleagues did not 
find this agreeable, he would step down. Politics of conviction proved clinching at this 
juncture, to ensure that reforms were not stillborn.   
 
In short, my findings on the issue of how the reform agenda could even begin to take shape in 
the wider context of dysfunctional politics, suggest two dominant themes. First, they question 
the more established view that pro-poor policies are only likely to take shape when the 
balance of the power shifts in favour of the poor. Instead, they show that under certain 
conditions, such as the rise to power in a state government of a political leader driving 
paradigmatic ideas for reform with conviction and commitment, supported by the kind of 
institutional structure created by Digvijay Singh and by reform-enabling everyday politics, 
pro-poor reform policies can take shape even in an apparently unfavourable context like that 
of MP. Second, at the same time they also question the naive assumption that pro-poor 
reform can be achieved entirely through a technocratic exercise, with policy entrepreneurs 
(bureaucrats and technocrats) solving problems of governance. While such contributions are 
needed, as the findings from MP show, they constitute only part of the story of governance 
reform. The rest, and arguably the larger part, of the story is political, even when it comprises 
politics played out by a few political agents, notably the central leader.  
 
 
The unfolding of the reform agenda on the ground 
The ground level implementation of the reform policies, however, involved more direct 
encounters with the existing politics-governance nexus. This allowed far fewer possibilities 
for insulating the implementation process, for positive institutional play with the lower level 
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governance structures, or for the enabling politics of the CM that were effective at the centre. 
As a result, the core premises of the reform agenda were put to a stringent test in local arenas. 
The following presents a few stylised facts about how the reform agenda unfolded and 
appeared on the ground. 
 
1. Inclusive participation and the deepening of democracy 
At first glance, the macro picture of the outcomes of the pursuit of the reform agenda appears 
to convey an impressive story of deepening democracy. Consider these figures: within the 
village level PRIs (the panchayats) from the backward castes, SCs and STs, 15,693 
sarpanchs and about 200,000 ward members, of which about one third were women, were 
enabled to occupy positions of authority. About 70 per cent of the representatives elected to 
the highest tier of the PRI (the Zila Parishad, or District Council) came from these 
marginalised sections of society. Hitherto unimaginable, holding a seat in this institution 
meant something dramatic, as the Zila Parishads were empowered to oversee even the 
mighty bureaucratic institution of the Collector. Many of them, who in the past might not 
even have dared to approach a block, let alone the district collector’s office, were now in 
charge of these offices (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Category-wise status of the elected representatives (1999 election)  
Source: Official documents from State Election Commission, State Panchayat  Department and the Election 
Departments of the research Districts. 
 
 District level Block level 
 SC ST BC UR Tot W SC ST BC UR Tot W 
State 121 [52] 
194 
[66] 
228 
[89] 
231 
[78] 774 
285 
 
1065 
[364] 
1827 
[652] 
1786 
[650] 
2033 
[690] 
6711 
 2356 
District 1 
(Vindhya 
Region) 
4 
[1] 
5 
[1] 
7 
[2] 
11 
[5] 27 9 
34 
[9] 
31 
[11] 
53 
[18] 
100 
[32] 218 70 
District 2 
(Mahakaushal 
Region) 
1 
[0] 
7 
[3] 
1 
[0] 
3 
[1] 12 4 
5 
[1] 
78 
[28] 
12 
[4] 
33 
[12] 128 45 
 
 
Panchayat level 
Sarpanch Panch 
 SC ST BC UR Tot W SC ST BC UR Tot W 
State  3172 [1083] 
7299 
[2488] 
5222 
[1778] 
6028 
[2033] 21721 7382 
48368 
[15943] 
81541 
[26848] 
71793 
[24121] 
98880 
[33435] 300582 100347 
District 1 
(Vindhya  
Region) 
127 
[42] 
111 
[37] 
205 
[67] 
372 
[125] 815 271 
1849 
[610] 
1622 
[518] 
2958 
[984] 
5484 
[1887] 11913 3999 
District 2 
(Maha-
kaushal 
Region)  
0 
[0] 
423 
[141] 
0 
[0] 
0 
[0] 423 141 
247 
[76] 
4269 
[1540] 
331 
[111] 
1227 
[453] 6074 2180 
[SC=Scheduled Caste; ST=Scheduled Tribe; BC= Backward Castes; UR= Unreserved; Tot=Total; W=Women]  
Figures in brackets refer to the number of women representatives under the category. 
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Massive as they are, these figures convey only a part of the story of democratic deepening. 
The rest came from a no less impressive range of figures of poorer people’s participation in 
democratic spaces created by the other reform programmes, such as the Watershed Project 
comprising user groups (UGs), self help groups (SHGs), thrift societies, and watershed 
committees (WCs; 50,000 members); 31,000 Gurujis and Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs 
– under the EGS; about 250,000 villagers as members); 4.8 million villagers in Forest 
Protection Committees; 1.5 million members in Tendupatta Collection Societie s; and above 
all, the numerous people’s committees (e.g. health committee, education council, resources 
committee, infrastructure committee) formed in each village of MP under the Gram 
Sawrajaya  (Village Republic) Act of 2001. The latter claimed to include about four or five 
million villagers as members. Taken at face value, this might suggest that the state of MP was 
engaged in not simply deepening democracy but in ushering in a democratic revolution, 
possibly hitherto unknown and unseen in the modern history of developing countries. 
Eminent scholars of decentralisation such as James Manor, indeed, have recognised it to be 
so.12 
 
The formal ground level operationalisation of these institutions and organisations undeniably 
structured huge democratic spaces, or new institutional spaces (NIS) as I prefer to term them 
as they all came with their respective sets of ‘new rules of the games.’ This resulted in an 
unprecedented increase in the scale and extent of representation of especially marginalised 
rural citizens. At the same time, the elaborate rules – for example, the requirement that the 
representatives face gram sabhas (assemblies of all the members of a village) – structured 
serious possibilities for deliberation and engagement around public issues amongst the 
citizens themselves as well as with their representatives to the NIS.13  
 
Thus, these NIS had the potential for realising the ‘structural pressure’ component of the 
theory of the agenda, and consequently for deepening the democracy in the interior of MP. 
However, the findings from my village-based studies convey a substantially different story. 
Whether in forward caste-dominated areas in the eastern Vindhya region of MP, where 
Brahmins and Rajputs held sway, or in the western Malwa region, where middle caste Patels 
and Patidars were in command of politics and society, the story was not very different: the 
new entrants from the poor castes and strata of society into the NIS were apparently 
controlled by the most powerful families from the dominant caste in the panchayat area. This 
was accomplished through multiple means: (a) de jure if the sarpanch’s seat was not 
reserved, by winning the seat themselves; (b) de-facto if the seat was reserved for women 
from the general caste by getting their wives elected; (c) if the seats were reserved for the 
backward castes, SCs or STs, indirectly by ensuring that their lagaus (or their wives) – their 
trusted and dependant sharecroppers, attached farm labourers, or house servants – won and 
sat at the front doors of the panchayat offices to do (or not) what they decided and dictated 
from the back door; and (d) somewhat remotely, by using the panchayat secretaries (often 
their kinsmen) to keep a check on a few relatively more independent-minded or politically 
active sarpanchas from these reserved communities, when they managed to win.  
 
                                                 
12 All figures from GoMP (2002) p.2. Tendupatta  = tobacco leaf used for rolling bidis, the traditional equivalent 
of cigarettes in  India, popular among the rural folk; Guruji = local teacher. 
13 Before the NIS, for the poor and low caste citizens the first level of representation was at the level of an 
administrative ‘block’, as the State Legislative Assemblies constituencies commonly coincided with a block. 
This meant that their representatives remained removed from the citizens, and the only way to hold them 
accountable was through the electoral process once in five years. Deliberation and engagement with them on a 
regular basis, and holding them accountable for their actions on an ongoing basis, were extremely difficult, 
almost  impossible. 
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The expectation that the setting up of multiple inclusive participatory structures might get 
around this problem was by and large belied as well, for whether in the watershed 
committees, or in the village committees for the EGS, the same powerful actors appeared and 
reappeared on the scene in decisive ways, directly or indirectly (see Annex A). Once the 
powerful controlled the PRIs, they manipulated the operational rules of the other 
participatory structures to make a lateral intrusion into them and so control them. For 
example, sarpanchas were entrusted to convene the gram sabhas under the PRI rules, and 
when the rules of the Watershed Programme required WCs to be approved by the gram 
sabhas, these were easily managed on paper or through the help of henchmen so as to enable 
the sarpanchas or their protégés to show that they had been selected as the chairmen of the 
WCs through due process.  
 
It ironically appeared that the asymmetries of the power structure exerted symmetrical 
influences across the varied range of participatory structures embodied by the NIS.  
 
2. Incentive variable and good governance   
The deepening of democracy, however, was not entirely expected from the ‘structural 
pressure’ of the NIS. As they were also expected to offer powerful incentives for reaping 
enhanced collective and individual benefits (through the implementation of a number of 
developmental programmes), this was supposed to complement and reinforce the process. 
The ground realities in this regard, however, presented a complex picture: pronounced 
perception among especially the poor rural citizens of a negligible say in, and disenchantment 
with, the running of the programmes; increased divisiveness and conflict among the more 
conscious and articulate villagers with highly damaging effects on project implementation; a 
vastly enhanced discourse around corruption; and generally poor programme outcomes were 
discernible. All of this seemed to run contrary to the premise that incentives of the NIS would 
be able to drive the reform process. Intriguingly, the story hardly differed even when the 
poor, and not the powerful, enjoyed the real command of the NIS. At the same time, the 
positive nature of the final outcomes in the case of EGS, despite its running contrary to the 
premises, rendered the ground realties hard to comprehend at first go. They did not convey a 
straightforward story of elite capture; of successes or failures. They appeared quite muddled. 
 
In sum, notwithstanding the strong developmental scope of the NIS, neither democracy 
appeared to have deepened nor good governance to have been achieved on the local terrain of 
MP, whosoever commanded and steered the NIS. Yet, muddled though their outcomes were 
in general, the programmes ran throughout MP, surprisingly with better outcomes in a few 
cases such as the EGS. 
  
A few select empirical findings will help illustrate: 
 
Jawahar Rojgar Yojna (JRY): With a transfer of control over this programme, hitherto 
exercised by the local bureaucracy, to the PRIs (more specifically to the village level 
panchayat) both premises of the theory were believed to have been powerfully 
operationalised. The ‘rules of the game’ potentially pressured the citizens and their 
representatives in panchayats to democratically deliberate in the gram sabhas. Aimed at 
securing a more inclusive management of the affairs of JRY, such deliberations for the first 
time afforded citizens as a whole an opportunity to voice their felt needs and select their 
preferred project, whereas in the past its decision-making process had remained an 
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exclusively in the hands of the local bureaucracy and elite. These were expected to reinforce 
the structural pressures and ensure compliance of the ‘rules of the game’, thus advancing the 
deepening of democracy. 
 
The incentive structure was strengthened by the bold and imaginative rule of the social audit, 
which enabled the panchayats to implement freely selected projects, doing away with the 
hitherto indispensable practice of technical audit.  This was presumed to end the corruption 
and harassment previously resulting from the government staff’s monopoly over project 
inspection, fund flow recommendations, and expenditure approval. The social audit was 
expected to enhance the quality of developmental benefits from the JRY, since the 
panchayats, overseen by the gram sabhas, were now in complete command.  
 
However, a different picture emerged in practice. Institutions of the gram sabhas, on which 
so much reliance was placed, hardly functioned. Mostly managed with the help of a few 
henchmen of the sarpanchas, they were reduced to paper exercises. Even the people’s 
representatives to the panchayats, the panchas (ward commissioners), rarely knew how the 
schemes were selected and prioritised, which remained the exclusive concern of the all-
powerful sarpanchas. The power of incentive proved ineffective too, as siphoning off the 
JRY funds for private gain was pervasive in all regions of MP, even in the less unequal 
societies of the tribal regions.  Almost everybody, including even the representatives 
themselves, ironically suggested that this had become possible because of the very social 
audit provision. Sarpanchas along with the secretaries of the panchayats and a few cronies 
had gone berserk, as they feared no checks or control under this system.  The gram sabhas 
that were supposed to perform this role were so muted or managed as to be ineffectual. 
Complaints made through bureaucratic channels were either ignored, or ended up enabling 
officials  to blackmail, instead of discipline, the  sarpanchas. There was much nostalgia for the 
vertical control system of the technical audit and supervision from above, the complete 
replacement of which, notwithstanding its shortcomings such as rent-seeking by the 
government personnel, was seen to have been a great mistake. 
  
 
Employment Assurance Programme (EAS): The institutional arrangements and incentive 
structure of the EAS followed a similar pattern to that of JRY. A democratic decision-making 
process controlled the much larger resource base of the EAS (about Rs. 5-10 million annually 
per block14), and was expected to be carried out more judiciously than before so as to fuel the 
local economy. The difference was in the layer of the PRIs at which this operated. 
Representatives to the district and block level PRIs, and not to the panchayats, came into 
play. In a way, this was more conducive to success, as they did not have to confront the 
powerful of the village that their counterparts in the panchayats did.  
 
Nevertheless, they had to deal with a different power structure that mingled with and 
influenced their decision-making processes. Political players at the higher level sneaked into 
the PRIs to sabotage the democratic processes, in order to continue with their political 
clientelism, albeit in somewhat modified ways that now required them to link up to and 
cultivate the micro-world of the PRI representatives, who acquiesced because they were 
politically weaker and needed to network with these politicians in order to secure their 
support.  
                                                 
 
14 Depending upon how the block was categorised in terms of its backwardness and its need for employment 
generation.   
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Table 2 shows the pattern of resource distribution in 99 panchayats of Research Block A in 
District 1 of the Vindhya region. It reveals that more than half the panchayats received no 
resources (not even a single project) during the entire four year programme period. While 
these panchayats were ignored year after year, there were 19 privileged panchayats that 
repeatedly got big projects (worth above Rs. 500,000 each), thereby securing 70 per cent of 
the total resources that had been made available to the Block over the period.  
 
Table 2: Summary of Panchayat wise distribution of EAS resources  Block 1A, District 1 (95-99) 
(Amt. in Rs. 00,000; see Annex B for details) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution within Block 1A, District 1 (1995-99) 
 
Amount No. of Pan. 
Total 
Amt. 
% of  
Panchayats 
(99) 
%  of 
(238.42) 
Above 10 3 35.43 3.03% 14.86% 
5 to 10 16 132.70 16.16% 55.66% 
Above 5 Lacs 19 168.13 19.19% 70.52% 
3 to 5 6 26.43 6.06% 11.08% 
0 to 3 21 43.86 21.21% 18.40% 
Below 5 Lacs 27 70.29 27.27% 29.48% 
Nil 53 0 53.54% 0% 
G.Tot. 99 238.42 100% 100% 
19168.13
27 70.29
53
 Above 5 Lacs   No. of
Panchayats
 Above 5 Lacs   Total
Amount
Below 5 Lacs  No. of
Panchayats
Below 5 Lacs  Total
Amount
Nil  No. of Panchayats
Nil  Total Amount
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One panchayat in this district was found to belong to this privileged category. When the 
‘success story’ of this panchayat was explored in some depth, the ex-sarpanch (forward caste 
Rajput), during whose tenure most of the EAS projects had come, was exceptionally candid. 
His tale (of his success), combined with the facts coming from the other numerous 
interviews, spoke of the brazen use of contacts, corruption, and machinations within a context 
of factionalism among the political bosses, MLAs and Ministers, and of their uneven power 
to influence particularly the district PRIs, and the local state in general.  
 
Once again, the pattern hardly changed in the tribal regions, or when representatives from the 
backward castes of the society in other parts were in command of, or had a say in, the higher 
levels of the PRIs. They also indulged in making deals with the sarpanchas, even when the 
sarpanchas belonged to the same marginalised sections of society to which they belonged, to 
secure their cuts in lieu of getting the EAS project sanctioned in their respective areas. 
 
Thus, this highly skewed distribution of projects and resources tells a story of sabotage, rather 
than deepening, of democracy. Incentives for improving the local economy once again 
appeared ineffective. What drove the actors in using the resources were their interests in 
upward networking from below by the sarpanchas and clientelism from above by higher 
level politicians. This, rather than the premises of the agenda, structured the distribution and 
spread of the EAS resources across the panchayats in a district. 
 
Watershed Development: It may be argued that the unanticipated results in the above cases 
were not so much due to problematic implementation as to weaknesses in programme design, 
because the incentives were not powerful, and were more collective than individual in 
character.  The implication of such an argument was that, had there been more individual 
benefits, these would have driven a better management of the programmes. 
 
The Watershed Project offers a convenient test case for this theory. Here the rural elite stood 
to make the maximum personal gain from realising the collective goods offered by the 
programme, which was aimed at strengthening agriculture, upon which their power and 
wealth was based. All projects under the programme holistically aimed at recharging the 
ground water table and enhancing the soil conditions, consequently improving fertility and 
the productivity of agricultural lands. Since such lands were largely under the control of the 
rural elite, the potential for considerable individual benefits could have driven them to run the 
programme effectively and eventually somewhat democratically too.  
 
The incentive structure should have helped the formation of different interest groups. 
However, what appeared common to all regions was a major lack of community 
understanding and involvement. The Watershed Committees (WCs) should have been 
constituted through a participatory process, with each interest group electing chairmen who 
would represent them on the committee. The WC would then elect a chairman, before 
obtaining the endorsement of the gram sabha. 
 
Yet in practice, the sarpanchas controlled the gram sabhas and could ensure the selection of 
themselves or their protégés as WC chairmen. The possibility of making considerable 
amounts of money, the enhancement in power and status, as well as increased patronage 
strength seemed to drive the actors more than the programme’s incentives, notwithstanding 
its stronger input of individual benefits. Thus, the legitimacy of the programme stood 
severely damaged. The community at large hardly felt involved; even the farmers, the 
greatest potential beneficiaries, appeared disillusioned and uninterested, as the belief was 
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widespread that the programme was a personal affair of the sarpanchs  and the officials, who 
alone stood to gain from it (mostly by corrupt practices). As a result, when asked to make a 
contribution to the projects that were to be undertaken on their personal or common fields, to 
build up a community fund for meeting the future needs of repair and maintenance, they used 
to refuse on the grounds that since sarpanchas were making the most out of the programme, 
such contributions should come from them. 
 
This is not to say that nothing was achieved: the tanks were made, check dams were erected, 
and even trenches dug on hilly slopes. Yet those were not motivated by the programme’s 
objectives but by other interests. As a result, their design was faulty, quality of construction 
was poor, and maintenance was almost absent. All this severely crippled the project’s 
capacity to deliver the desired results.  
  
Education Guarantee Scheme (EGS): Recognising the vast geographical spread and 
difficult terrain of the rural areas, which had constrained the poor living in remote hamlets 
and villages from accessing education facilities often distantly located, the EGS was 
introduced as a pioneering programme in the country to address this situation. In brief, its 
provision was that if a hamlet or a village did not have a government primary school within a 
kilometre radius, and had 40 school-going children (25 in a tribal region), it could demand 
that the state open a school, which the state guaranteed to do within 90 days. If the state 
failed, invoking the provision of the guarantee, the community could start a school of their 
own by selecting a local educated person (up to twelfth grade) as the guruji (teacher), along 
with providing space for it to run. In such an eventuality, the state was obliged to provide an 
honorarium to the selected guruji (about Rs. 500 monthly in the initial years of the 
programme, which increased to Rs. 1,000 and Rs. 1,250 subsequently), train her, and provide 
the reading-writing materials to the children, while leaving the management and control of 
the school in the hands of the community.  
 
Started in 1997, by mid-2003 about 30,000 schools had been founded under this programme 
covering about 55,000 MP villages. The government’s proud declaration of having achieved 
the goal of universal access to primary education was largely founded on this effort. Among 
the many reform programmes studied, this was the only one that largely delivered its 
outcomes well across all three study districts, notwithstanding serious vitiations in its 
procedures and processes. There was hardly any evidence of EGS schools coming from a 
community demand, let alone of community involvement in their oversight. Once again the 
sarpanchas, whether from the powerful groups or the poor, were the main actors driving this 
programme. They clearly saw a great opportunity in the programme to favour their 
unemployed kith and kin, or those who bribed them (generally the unemployed educated 
youth in the rural areas), with the posts of the gurujis to let them earn some amount, however 
little, provided through the honorarium.  
 
Nevertheless, such gurujis, who due to their connections with the most powerful families of 
their areas could have shirked from running the schools without much fear of community 
control, were found to be working diligently. The poor, whose children most benefited from 
the EGS schools, and the villagers at large considered the performance of the EGS schools 
even better than the adjoining government schools, despite the latter having on their rolls 
superior teachers, who were well paid, trained, and had a secure career. In a number of 
places, children were shifted out of regular schools to join EGS schools.  
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That such an outcome could be possible despite capture of a pro-poor programme, largely by 
the elite, apparently goes against received wisdom. Such a counterintuitive finding demands a 
deeper analytical examination of the issues of power and capture.  
 
Unravelling the black box of power and capture   
The evidence shows that the ‘power’ of the crafted institutions, expected to robustly derive 
from their rules and incentives, did not work on the ground, because they could not resist the 
serious unintended and adverse mutations in the functioning of the NIS and their 
programmes. However, a simplistic use of an ‘elite capture’ explanation does not apply in 
this case,15 for the following reasons:  
a) Instances of vitiated processes and outcomes of the NIS, irrespective of who was in 
command: elites or non-elites;  
b) Negation of a commonly assumed linear inverse relationship between elite capture 
and pro-poor programme outcomes, exemplified by the case of the EGS;  
c) Failure of programme incentives to induce NIS actors, especially elites, to reap direct 
benefits, let alone collective goods, on offer.  
It should be evident from the above, and contrary to the common assumption, that our 
understandings of how power and interests, ideas and incentives, participation and 
deliberative engagements, and institutions and agency work in unequal societies, and when 
and why they combine viciously or virtuously to respectively resist or promote positive 
institutional changes, are far from complete. In short, the black box of power, capture, and 
institutional change still needs to be unravelled, in order to move the debate beyond the 
notion of a linear causal relationship between power and capture towards an exploration of 
the deeper causalities of their more complex interrelationships. The discussion that follows is 
an attempt in this direction. I have structured it through raising a set of analytically distinct 
yet closely interlinked issues, which hopefully reveal multi-causal forces and their 
interactions that lie under what was seen on the ground in MP. 
 
The first order question: Why did structural pressure not work?  
The ‘rules of the game’ of the NIS should have facilitated local democracy, and in time good 
governance. Consider a panchayat. Hitherto the powerful could exert exclusive control over 
public issues due to their connections to, and influence over, local offices. But panchayat 
rules demanded that they must involve other elected ward commissioners, mostly from the 
backward and the SC/ST communities, and face gram sabhas, without which decisions about 
the selection of schemes, granting of old age pensions, recruitment of gurujis to the EGS 
schools, and so forth, were invalid and use of resources illegal. As the rules had the force of a 
statute, the entire village had oversight, and violations attracted multiple sanctions, these 
should have constrained dominance by a few and facilitated democracy for the majority in the 
local arenas.  
 
Yet, it did not. It is often pointed out that the success of decentralised and participatory 
institutions depend on adequate authority, resources (both funds and functionaries) and 
accountability. However, this ignores the role of the interplay between the wider institutional 
                                                 
15 I refer to the Madisonian principle of ‘elite capture’ in the Federalist Papers (no.10), which, in essence, states 
that the lower the level of government, the greater is its proneness to capture by local vested interests, and the 
lesser the chances that the poor and the minority are protected.  
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context, ‘ideas’ behind the institutions, agency’s role in reinterpretation and reversal of 
incentive structure, and perverse institutional play for dismantling the community 
accountability structure. I begin with the last first to inductively move upwards to discuss the 
rest.  
 
Three elements were crucial to the PRIs to realise their potential: (a) the rules should be 
played well inside the PRIs; (b) gram sabhas had to work as an effective concurrent 
enforcement mechanism; and (c) ex-post enforcement mechanisms had to play their role, 
especially when the other elements proved weak.  
 
1. Ex-ante structural blocks to entry and participation of capable actors  
The effectiveness of the internal rules of the PRIs was heavily contingent upon the entry of 
capable representatives from different, but especially the poorer, sections of society. This 
would have ensured that the rules were understood and played well, and that vitiations, if 
attempted, would be challenged effectively from within. Such an entry was effectively 
blocked at the panchayat level. Mainly the laguas of the powerful, and not the capable actors 
or natural leaders from especially the poor communities, were made to stand against and win 
the reserved posts of sarpanchas or panchas. Not that the capable actors did not exist, but for 
obvious reasons they were not preferred by the powerful who were fighting a battle by proxy. 
Such actors avoided competing independently, since these institutions were not visualised as 
advantageous for their lives or their communities, or they feared the powerful due to an 
absence of a wider support structure, or were too subordinated to even contemplate such a 
choice.  
 
However, the problem was more complex. Even when a few competent players got in, either 
when they had the support of a primarily poor-oriented political party (such as the BSP), or 
had the courage to compete and win (generally by default due to a highly divisive local 
politics in the area), once in command most of them were seen to be copying the feudalism of 
the powerful, rather than destructing it from within for driving democracy. To belong to a 
marginalised caste group hardly had an impact on this pattern. It was quite evident in the 
Malwa region, where most of the representatives to the PRIs came from backward caste 
communities, and yet their shared cultural identities, and feelings of being a humiliated and 
exploited social group, hardly made any difference in their approach towards running the 
PRIs, nor to the poor from their own castes. Even in the tribal regions, which have the least 
unequal society, the pattern was not markedly different; and if such articulate actors occupied 
less commanding positions, for example as panchas, they preferred the ‘loyalty’ option 
(through cooptation by the sarpanchas) to that of  ‘voice’.  
 
At the higher levels of the PRIs, the conditions were even more complicated. Here the 
representatives from the weaker strata of the society were not the laguas of the local powerful 
as their counterparts usually were in the panchayats. Individually they were more educated, 
articulate, and assertive, with the additional strength of networks in the villages and 
connections to, and support of, state-level politicians (Ministers/MP/MLAs). Yet, this did not 
result in more democratic deliberation and practice, and a more judicious use of 
developmental resources.  
 
Hence I argue that even if the rules provide for a sufficient authority structure in the 
decentralised institutions, it requires strong agency on the part of those involved to play these 
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out positively. Ex-ante structural blocks to entry or transmuted interests of competent players 
have such an adverse impact on the rules, however well designed, that the task of their 
rectification through concurrent and ex-post enforcement mechanisms is rendered extremely 
difficult.  
 
 
2. Perverse ‘institutional play’ and the muting of the concurrent enforcement  
mechanism of the gram sabha 
The concurrent enforcement mechanism of the gram sabhas, which had been conceived as 
the best instrument for solving such ex-ante vitiations and designed to revitalise the 
institutions and ensure that they functioned in the intended way, proved a dismal failure. 
Everybody agreed that if this had worked as expected, most of the weaknesses observed on 
the ground would not have arisen. So the question is not whether a robust accountability 
system was in place or not, as it surely was. Instead, the issue is why it proved ineffective. 
The research findings suggest the following reasons: 
a) Its design was utopian. With the poor hardly mustering the courage to stand against 
the wishes of the powerful in elections conducted through secret ballots, they were 
hardly likely to raise voice against them in an open meeting of a gram sabha; 
b) But gram sabhas gave a unique opportunity to the other elites of the rural areas to act 
for various incentives: for example, elite competition around the control of PRIs; or 
interest in ensuring good governance around the programmes to benefit them and the 
area. Even if these more self-directed incentives had driven different actors within the 
elite group to activate the gram sabhas, a consequent indirect building up of local 
democracy would have been eventually possible, helping the poor to gain some 
flexibility around their involvement. Indeed, this possibility was perceived as a real 
threat by the powerful in control of the PRIs. But this was forgone by potential 
challengers in return for shares in the pilferage, which the sarpanchas were only too 
happy to part with directly, or through their co-option in different committees, so as to 
pre-empt such a threat;16 
c) However, this might not have worked all the time or with everybody. A few might 
nevertheless make a challenge. To ward this off, and also because such challenges 
were largely perceived as destructive in nature,17 gram sabhas eventually fell into 
disuse, by reducing them to a managed show or even simply a paper exercise; 
d) Additionally, it was widely reported that interests waned over time, reinforcing the 
above. It is not uncommon to find people flocking to a meeting when personalised, 
immediate and credible benefits appear to flow from it. If not, deliberations over 
                                                 
16 More conspicuous in the Malwa region, where in the WCs if the Congress party supporters had secured the 
chairmanship they would strategically bring in important opposition BJP party supporters from the rural elite as 
the other members, and share the spoils with them to sustain their overall hold on the programme in the village, 
and vice versa. 
17 A number of sarpanchas shared the acute problem of facing destructive interference by the competing elites, 
which tended to find faults in what they had done, and lower their public esteem. During an interview, a 
sarpanch of the Vindhya region put this scenario to us rather caustically: “Have you ever found that in the 
Parliament or in the Assembly, the winning candidate (MP or MLA) has to sit with all his opponents who had 
fought against him in the election to deliberate upon matters which he has to decide and be ultimately 
responsible for? But, we have to face exactly this in a gram sabha, if p roperly organised. All our opponents 
would be there with their supporters outnumbering my supporters to paint me in black and do not let me 
function. How can we hold the gram sabhas in such a scenario?” 
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collective good matters, or lofty but vague ideals of village improvement through 
cooperation, have little staying power. 
 
Thus, notwithstanding the robustness of the rules of the pivotal enforcement mechanism of 
the NIS, concerned actors could play those in such a deft but adverse way that it ultimately 
stood muted. 
 
3. Overriding the ex-post community enforcement mechanism 
Four ex-post enforcement mechanisms can be identified. Two of these (the audit system and 
governmental sanctions) are vertical accountability systems related to the functioning of the 
local state, and will not be discussed here. The other two fall within the horizontal 
community-based accountability system, and are briefly discussed below. 
 
Firstly, employment of the ‘the right to recall’ could have salvaged the situation. If after three 
years two thirds of the panchas moved a resolution of no-confidence demanding the recall of 
their sarpanch, then the matter could be put to a public vote before the public. The result 
could ensure removal of a defaulting sarpanch. This was revolutionary and MP was the first 
state to build this provision into the PRI Act. However, this remained in almost complete 
disuse.18 This was possibly because sarpanchas were alert to this provision, and regularly 
paid the panchas to ensure that two thirds of them always remained on their side and were 
not weaned away by rivals. Ironically this powerful provision, which was intended to keep a 
sarpancha alert to her tasks, instead resulted in a perverse alertness with successful but 
unintended outcomes. 
 
Secondly, if everything else failed, elections after five years were expected to come in as last 
resort to account for the deeds and misdeeds of the representatives. In MP, as only one 
election in 1999 had been conducted after the initial election conducted in 1994, it was 
difficult to judge how much this had an impact. However, a few indirect indicators were 
available. Had the elections sent signals of punishing the guilty and rewarding the 
performers, the public discourse in regard to the PRIs could have been perceived as changing 
from bad to good. But, it was the reverse. There are numerous examples that show that 
initially the common people waited patiently in hope that the panchayati raj would 
eventually benefit the ir lives too, even when they saw only a few disproportionately 
benefiting from the system. But following long years of unfulfilled hopes with a minority 
from their villages and areas continuing to colonise the institutions for their personal benefit, 
they had become utterly disillusioned, and that sense of disillusionment was widely 
expressed. This could not have occurred had the elections worked as an effective enforcement 
instrument. 
 
                                                 
18 In the three research districts comprising of about 200 panchayats, I did not come across a single incidence of 
use of this provision 
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The second order question: Why did the ‘incentive variable’ not work?19   
Institutions must also provide incentives to follow the rules; mere structural pressure does not 
suffice, and the NIS had been, as claimed, robustly designed around this principle. However, 
this also remained ineffective. Why? 
 
4. Do ‘elite capture’ and other incentive theories explain?  
Elite capture and its linear inverse relationship with good governance: The evidence 
presented here refutes this. First, capture usually refers to a state of seizure and subversion of 
opportunities for the betterment of the poor at the hands of elites. Hence, instances of 
subversion of programmes of the NIS, that were likely to benefit elites more than the poor, 
may hardly qualify as such. Second, precisely for this reason it can be expected that an 
asymmetry of power and consequent capture of the NIS may not demonstrate a linear inverse 
relationship with outcomes on good governance.  
 
This can be stated in the following way: regardless of the initial capture and control of the 
NIS by the powerful, once the advantages of the developmental benefits offered by the NIS, 
and importance of democratising rather than dominating their affairs in order to unleash 
these, are well understood, vested interests would eventually become reoriented towards 
promoting good governance and inclusive practices. Other incentives – such as community 
approval and honour, or serving the citizens well to reproduce power in the NIS and in the 
society – could reinforce this as well. This would set off a positive chain reaction: incentive 
for securing developmental benefits and social honour – interest in letting NIS function 
democratically to unleash them – realisation of the rewards – enhanced interest in promoting 
good governance and deeper democracy. 
 
The findings on EGS lend strong credence to this. As already observed, despite the capture of 
the EGS programme by the powerful sarpanchas, the resultant possibility of gurujis misusing 
their connections to them to shirk their responsibilities, and almost non-existent community 
vigilance and control over such teachers, they were reported to be running the schools well, 
sometimes even better than the government schools. This shows that elite capture can not be 
used to simplistically explain the incentive failures and poor governance of other 
programmes. Hence, let us consider a few other explanations. 
 
Mismatch between institutional incentives and actors’ preferences: Institutions may be 
designed well to offer a set of incentives, but with a basic flaw. They may not correspond to 
                                                 
19 There is a considerable and growing literature on issues surrounding incentive and organisational 
performance, the principal-agent relationship (which, inter alia, engage with the incentive question), and the 
role of agency and human motivation. See, for example, James L. Payne & Oliver H. Woshinsky, ‘Incentives for 
Political Participation’, World Politics, 24:4 (1972), pp.518-546; David E. M. Sappington, ‘Incentives in 
Principal-Agent Relationships’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives. 5:2 (1991), pp.45-66; ErnstFehr & 
Armin Falk, ‘Psychological Foundations of Incentives’, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, 
University of Zurich. Working Paper Series Working Paper No. 95. Schumpeter Lecture Annual Conference of 
the European Economic Association, 2001; Michel Poitevin, ‘Can the Theory of Incentives Explain 
Decentralization?’ The Canadian Journal of Economics, 33:4 (2000), pp.878-906; Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, 
‘Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review’, The Academy of Management Review, 14:1 (1989), pp.57-74; 
Peter Frumkin & Gabriel Kaplan, ‘Neo-Institutional Theory and the Micro-Macro Link’, Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University. Working Paper Series, 2000; Paul Pierson, ‘When Effect Becomes Cause: 
Policy Feedback and Political Change’, World Politics, 45:4 (1993), pp.595-628; Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil 
Mullainathan, ‘Agents with and without Principals’, Working Paper, Department of Economics, MIT, 2000; and 
Stephan Fuchs, ‘Beyond Agency’, Sociological Theory, 19:1 (2001), pp.24-40. 
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what the affected actors want. However, my research does not confirm this. Given the 
prevalence of a widespread resentment against the malfunctioning of government offices, 
measures that promised freedom from the clutches of corrupt junior engineers, defiant 
teachers, torturous and long journeys to distant offices often to face the insensitivity and 
apathy of the officials, were indeed welcome. The match of incentives, even if not perfect, 
was substantial, and finds a succinct but eloquent expression in the words of one district level 
officer:  
Who study in the village schools? Who use road and check dam? Villagers 
themselves. Once implementation of these projects is in their hands, they are 
bound to do it better than us. For they, and not we (bureaucrats), will have the 
highest concern to see a robust roof of a school building, lest it will collapse to 
hurt their own children.  
It is true that elites and non-elites alike not only wanted good quality school construction but 
also believed that if that was in their hands it could also be realised well. Hence, if there was 
any mismatch, then it was more between their beliefs and actions than between institutional 
incentives and their personal preferences. 
 
Flawed incentive ordering: More explicitly, the NIS offered material incentives, both in the 
form of collective and of individual benefits. However, material and monetary rewards do not 
entirely meet human motivational urges, much less when they are not immediate and 
pecuniary in nature, as in most cases of the NIS programmes. They also need, for example, 
the satisfaction of social approval, status and honour, reciprocity, and friendship. Despite the 
explicitness of developmental (material) benefits, these were not wanting in the NIS. In fact, 
expectations that the gurujis, elected representatives, chairmen and members of the WCs, and 
the like would work day and night for the good of society, when hardly any direct pecuniary 
benefits in the form of salary or perks were made available, was strongly premised upon the 
compensation of community recognition and social honour. However, had this been so, 
increasingly improving programme performance by the NIS, and not it’s the reverse, would 
have been the order of the day. 
 
5. Incentive reinterpretation  
Play of agency’s reflective capacity in a wider institutional context: So what went wrong 
with the incentive variable? The findings suggest that the incentives on offer underwent a 
radical reinterpretation and reversal in nature. The following will help elaborate. 
 
Take the case of the JRY, EAS and the Watershed Programmes. Getting them well 
implemented would have possibly rewarded actors in control of the PRIs and the WCs. 
However, what is often ignored or underplayed in the decentralisation and participation 
debates is that such actors are primarily political actors with ambitions for achieving upward 
mobility in the political world. Such ambitions do not get fulfilled by stepping into the NIS 
only.  It was therefore unsurprising when a young backward caste woman, with a PhD in 
political science, who was one of the vocal members of the District PRI in the Vindhya 
region, informed me how well she had prepared her ground by her work as PRI 
representative, and also by ensuring that the CM had a personal knowledge of those to expect 
on the party ticket for the position of MLA in the coming state election in December 2003. In 
the adjoining district, I attended a big meeting in which thousands of PRI representatives, 
WC chairmen, and Self Help Group members from all over the district participated. This had 
been organised by the Chairman of the District PRI, who was said to be keenly contesting the 
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MLA ticket for the Congress (I) party to replace its existing MLA. Despite the stated goals, 
the meeting was organised far less for discussing the issues of PRI and development, but 
much more to impress the CM, who was present, with a show of the aspiring Chairman’s 
organisational and mobilising capabilities. 
 
With such political ambitions, the incentives offered by the NIS were restructured against the 
template of the workings of the higher level political institutions in MP. Their ‘rules of the 
game’ required comprehension and compliance if the ambitions of the new actors were to be 
realised. The rules in the higher political arena defined how in a party politically ambit ious 
actors rose from below; got tickets for MLA/MP positions; how successful elections were 
fought; and so on. It was hardly hidden that these required money, upward connections, 
downward networks, patronage politics, and sycophancy. Even when the higher level 
politicians spoke about the glory that good NIS performance could bring to the involved 
actors, they were clever to recognise this as rhetoric, since unless they had the resources and 
the connections that mattered in the higher but murky world of politics such a glory would 
hardly let them move up the ladder..  
 
In this wider context, the NIS and their programmes were conjured up differently, as a source 
of vast opportunities to realise the newly fired ambitions. Resultantly, siphoning off the 
programme funds, building connections and networks utilising these, and financially insuring 
against the risks and uncertainties involved in moving up were viewed as offering far more  
than would securing an honourable life within the confines of a village. 
 
Redefining process had begun early: Such restructuring of the meaning of the NIS had begun 
even before these had been operationalised. There was quite an excitement in the air, as 
different respondents told us, particularly about the coming of the new PRIs, not on account 
of their enabling the people to manage their own development and destiny, but for the greater 
and more direct opportunities of siphoning off government money it might provide.  
 
This perverse discourse was so pervasive and persuasive that even before a reality check 
could be made about such potentialities of the NIS, different candidates had entered the fray 
investing about Rs.20,000-50,000 in the non-tribal regions, and Rs.10,000-20,000 in the tribal 
regions, for winning the sarpanch’s post (the smallest office in the entire PRI structure), not 
to mention superior posts that obviously required greater investments. Added to this were the 
purchases of motorcycles and Tata Sumos (jeeps) once victories were attained, as by then the 
confidence was high that rich dividends would be made on these investments. Those who 
knew and experienced this grinding discourse showed no surprise upon hearing what an ex-
CEO, an IPS officer, of one district panchayat of MP had shared with me:  
When he [as the ex CEO] had shown reluctance to comply with the wish of the 
lady Chairman of the District Panchayat, where he was posted, to manage a 
backdoor selection of a number of her preferred candidates as the Shiksha Karmis 
[contract teachers; this implied at least about Rs. 20,000 per candidate as her 
rent], she had asserted her claim with these remarks: “But, how would I pay back 
for the purchase of Tata Sumo that I have already done?”  
 
The power of redefinition drew almost everybody in the game: It is this redefining of the 
incentive system that helps to understand the rather puzzling fact that even when the poor 
had, with political support or otherwise, gained a more effective control of the PRIs or other 
structures, they also largely followed the same strategy. They were even encouraged to do so 
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by their political mentors. During an interview with the BSP MLA of the block under 
research in the Vindhya region, she asserted when we discussed this issue: “An honest 
sarpanch would remain sarpanch all his life”. The implication was clear: if she were to rise 
further in the party, she had to restructure the localised definitions of incentives and morality 
that the NIS offered.  
 
This was quite an apt description of the reality, as the MLAs/MPs, as well as the ministers, 
whether from the tribal, backward, SCs or STs, or the forward castes, were only reinforcing 
the scenario by what they were doing for their own political advancement. For example, the 
backward caste sarpanch in a panchayat in Vindhya proudly showed me the sanction letter of 
a panchayat building project, which he could manage by paying Rs.12,000 to a dalal (fixer) 
of the MLA of the area; and the tribal ex-sarpanch in another panchayat of the same district 
candidly told us that with the help of his panchayat secretary he could find the right contact, a 
school teacher, through whom he ensured a payment of Rs.15,000 to the ex-chairman of the 
District Panchayat, later District Congress President, to get a road scheme worth about 
Rs.200,000 sanctioned under the EAS, which he could afford by (mis)utilizing the JRY 
funds.  
 
In the tribal Mahakaushal region, where such practices were least suspected, investigations 
were especially revealing. The chairman of one of the WCs enthusiastically explained to us 
how highly the ex-sarpanch used to rate him as an efficient and trusted lieutenant, which is 
why he had secured his selection as the chairman of the WC in absentia. At the same time, he 
also shared his recent frustrations in running the programme, because the same ex-sarpanch 
had begun undermining him. When pressed to unravel this puzzling turnaround of his mentor, 
he finally had to say the following: 
 
He [the ex-sarpanch] gradually realised what potentials the programme had in 
store for making money, and has grown repentant over letting such an 
opportunity go away from his direct control 
 
Thus, it was not surprising to find that the tribal Chairman of the District Panchayat in the 
Mahakaushal region also did the same, even when the sarpanchas who approached him were 
from the tribal community. Most of them had drafted non-tribal PAs on deputation from the 
lower bureaucracy, who were known for their reputation of being ‘experts’ on how to play 
the game profitably yet safely, in order to help the new public leaders acquire similar 
expertise.  
 
This also explains the rather puzzling scenario of the easy co-optation of even the competing 
powerful elites. Rather than seeking to do something different and constructive with their 
control of the NIS, elite competition was aimed at doing the same things that successful rivals 
were engaged in, namely mobilising finances and crafting networks to personal and political 
advantage. If this was achievable even if partially through co-optation, why incur the cost of 
competition? 
 
Redefinition could result in positive outcomes too: However, in stark contrast stood the result 
of the redefining of the incentives of the EGS programme. The strong motivation of the  
gurujis to do well came partly from these factors: unemployed as they were, the honorarium, 
however small, provided them with an income; and the respect of the community resulting 
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from educating children from its most deprived sections was rewarding, all the more if the 
teachers themselves came from such a background.  
 
However, almost unequivocally all officials, parents and teachers interviewed revealed 
something different that had worked decisively, even if the aforementioned incentives had 
played a background role. What motivated most of these unemployed youth was a strong 
expectation, almost a belief, that the government would provide them with permanent career 
posts, if they did well as a guruji. This was astonishing, as nothing in the programme’s design 
and the mode of its implementation had even remotely suggested, explicitly or implicitly, that 
such a possibility existed. Yet such an incentive was believed to exist, or was cognitively 
structured and attributed to the programme in every region. 20 But in this case, the redefining 
of the incentive system, entirely unintended by the programme, had a highly positive impact 
on the programme’s outcome. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The empirical findings discussed above and the analysis presented can be summed up in the 
following five analytical propositions: 
Proposition 1: Crafting new institutions is rarely a matter of design, but involves 
difficult dynamics of ‘real world institutional reconciliation’ between new and 
pre-existing institutions. 
New progressive institutions can rarely be crafted without encounters with pre-existing and 
often regressive institutional arrangements. Thus the rules, enforcement structures and 
incentives embodied by new institutions, however well provided, are not enough on their own 
unless they can be reconciled with those of the pre-existing institutions in such a way as to 
preserve the  efficacy of earlier institutional arrangements. In other words, positive and 
effective institutional reconciliation, key to the successful grounding of new institutions, is 
not a matter of design, but of the dynamics of how conflicts and contradictions between new 
and pre-existing institutional arrangements are resolved in favour of the former.  
 
Proposition 2: Institutional reconciliation requires exercise of ‘agency’ of the 
actors involved, especially the interpretative processes related to agency. 
The dynamics and outcomes emerging from the introduction of new institutions are 
determined by the mediating role played by the agency of actors involved in the process. 
Contrary to institutionalist assumptions, the rules and incentives of new institutions do not 
shape behaviour unilaterally, irrespective of the quality of institutional design and the power 
of enforcement structures. Actors rarely respond passively to newly crafted institutions. 
Instead, an active, even pro-active, role is played by actors, who read the new institutional 
arrangements (especially the incentives on offer) against a template of their past experiences 
(around the workings of the pre-existing institutions) and future hopes and aspirations. Such 
                                                 
20 So intense was this restructuring that when after a few years no induction into government jobs had occurred, 
the EGS teachers formed a state-wide union, and along with the other contract teachers’ unions, started 
agitating, even going on hunger strike. A number of teachers and officials felt that due to the expectation not 
getting fulfilled after five years of the programme, there was a perceptible decline in the enthusiasm and 
commitment of the teachers, which threatened to impair the future performance of the programme.  
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an exercise of interpretation and reinterpretation of what the new institutions offer is critical 
to shaping the outcomes of institutional reconciliation. 
 
Proposition 3: The interpretative role of agency is proximately influenced by 
three factors: (a) interests and aspirations of the actors involved; (b) linkages of 
these with the incentives on offer within the new institutions vis-à-vis those within 
pre-existing institutions; and (c) the effectiveness (or in-effectiveness) of the 
enforcement structure embodied in the new institutions. 
The interpretive process is not a matter of discretion, unexplained choices or absolute free 
will of the actors involved (though idiosyncrasies play a role too, albeit in small and often 
indecisive ways). If the workings of the new institutions are hardly seen to be directly helpful 
in realising the interests and aspirations of the actors involved, and the pre-existing 
institutions are still seen as more effective means for achieving those, then a positive 
institutional reconciliation is unlikely. Instead, actors will be strongly inclined to reinterpret 
and redefine the new institutional workings and incentives in ways that secure a better fit 
with those of the pre-existing ones, and thus will vitiate the new institutions. Additionally,  the 
ineffectiveness or effectiveness of the enforcement structure of the new institutions will 
respectively aggravate or mitigate such vitiation. However, if new institutional incentives are 
viewed as directly and more effectively promoting the interests and aspirations of the actors 
involved, even with a weak enforcement structure, the new institutions are likely to gain 
ground over pre-existing ones. 
 
Proposition 4: The interpretive role of agents is shaped, though not determined, 
by ideas.  
However, even interests and aspirations are not entirely given. How well the crafted 
institutions are ideationally underpinned (i.e. how effectively the worldviews of the actors 
involved are appropriately (re)-structured to redefine their interests and aspirations, in ways 
that align well with the premises and the purposes of the new institutions) can, in turn, have a 
significant impact on the final outcomes of processes of institutional reconciliation. However, 
it is important to understand that ideas rarely alter the fundamental content of interests and 
aspirations. But what they can do is significantly transform their form and expression, which 
can then significantly affect the direction and content of interpretive processes.  
 
Proposition 5: The successful grounding of new institutions is most likely to be the 
result of an interlinkage between ideas, interests and agency rather than the 
result of institutional  design per se. 
Taking all the propositions together, what can be argued is that the interlinkage between 
ideas, interests and agency, which is more likely to play an effective role in securing a better 
grounding of  new institutions, emerges through the following casual chain:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideas 
Changed worldviews of 
actors, redefining their 
interests in alignment with 
new institutional 
objectives and incentives 
Agency’s reflective and re-
interpretive role in securing 
positive institutional 
reconciliation (i.e. in 
establishing the pre-eminence 
of the new institutions over the 
pre-existing ones) 
Better or 
successful 
grounding of the 
new institutions 
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Interest and aspirations of 
involved actors 
Incentives offered 
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If this dynamics reconciles the contradictions 
between new and pre-existing institutions in 
favour of the former, then 
Successful 
If reconciliation are secured 
in favour of latter, then 
Unsuccessful or Poor 
Proximate  
Ideational underpinning: Structuring worldviews of actors  Deeper 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Deepening the Analytical Understanding of Institutional Change: The Analytical Insights 
from the MP Research 
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This improved analytical framework helps to correct the shortcomings of earlier 
interpretations of institutional change, which are usually presented entirely through the 
conceptual prism of the inherent strengths of new rules, their incentives (in the form of 
offered collective goods) and enforcement structures embodied in the new institutions, by 
bringing in the crucial but missing analytical variables of actors’ ideas, interests and 
aspirations, and their agency. Thus, it offers a fresh and deeper perspective on the vexed issue 
of institutional change. Introducing these analytical variables allows us to take account of the  
crucial mediation role they play in the almost inevitable episodes of resistance, backlash and 
sabotage that occur in the confrontation between new and pre-existing institutions. These 
variables are brought to centre stage in our understanding of how and why new institutions 
prove effective (well grounded) in some instances, and perform poorly in others.  
 
This framework alerts us to the errors that reformers commit in crafting new progressive 
institutions, usually due to a belief in the theoretically exaggerated presumption with which 
institutionalists work, that if rules, enforcement structures and incentive design are right, 
institutions should matter, and do so decisively. Actors and their agency are viewed as 
dependant variables, always responsive to new rules and incentives. However, actors do not 
allow themselves to be incorporated by new institutions passively, but do so through critical 
engagement with their premises and possibilities, and this is a two-way process. In it, actors 
reflectively, and not reflexively, read from a large repertoire of their past experiences, current 
workings of the wider contexts surrounding and enmeshing their lives, and future aspirations 
held in conjunction with what is offered by new institutions. In so doing, they define and 
redefine the premises and possibilities of the new institutions in ways that fit best the pursuit 
of their interests and aspirations, which, interestingly, can assume content and contours that 
are hardly anticipated by the reformers, let alone intended.  
 
This is what seems to have happened on the ground in MP, which led the actors to redefine 
the advantages of the NIS – collective developmental benefits and social rewards – in 
damagingly alternate ways. In this, use of the projects and their resources for connecting and 
moving vertically upwards in life and politics (the real interests and aspirations of the actors 
involved) was viewed as more rewarding than securing the designed advantages within the 
new institutional arrangements. With this shift or even reversal in the meanings of the crafted 
incentives, the democratic ambitions of the NIS also stood supplanted through sabotage and 
suppression. This was inevitable, since these latter practices, and not the former that had 
become redundant under the changed context, fitted better the realisation of the interests of 
the actors involved. However, interestingly the vector of such reversals counter- intuitively 
had a positive impact in at least one case, the EGS, since interpretive processes involved 
therein secured a good fit between the pursuit of the actors’ interests and the programme 
objectives.  
 
Institutions matter, but only when their ideational underpinning and structural elements help 
actors pursue their interests and aspirations in ways that also promote the objectives of the 
institutional reforms. Therefore, reformers must seriously take into account the real world 
dynamics of institutional reconciliation, which involve interplay between ideas, interests and 
agency, to ground the progressive institutional changes well. It is high time institutionalists 
incorporate these as analytical variables in their theorising about institution building, to be 
able to offer more relevant and robust insights for policy makers and practitioners. 
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Annex A 
Chairmen of the Watershed Committees, Block A, District 1 (Mili-basin No. 2A7E2J)  
 
 
Micro-W 
No. 
Panchayat 
Name First Term Second Term 
  Sarpanch WC Chairman Sarpanch  WC Chairman 
1 I (Research area) 
PT (forward 
caste Brahmin) 
Sarpanch himself 
Mrs. PL (de facto 
sarpanch her husband 
PT) 
Sarpanch herself  (de 
facto sarpanch her 
husband) 
2 II AP (backward 
caste Patel) 
Sarpanch himself 
 
Mrs. KS (a lady 
member from SC 
community who was 
ensured victory by the 
rival of the previous 
sarpanch AP) 
Mrs. KS (Ouster of AP 
was also ensured as a 
result of change of 
power controlling the 
sarpanch. Through 
Mrs. KS, the WC is 
controlled by the de 
facto sarpanch, the real 
power behind Mrs. KS.) 
3 III LP (backward 
caste Patel) 
Sarpanch himself ? LP 
4 IV and V Mrs. PD 
(Brahmin) 
Sarpanch herself  
(de facto sarpanch 
her husband) 
Mrs. PD 
Sarpanch herself  (de 
facto sarpanch her 
husband) 
5 VI TJP (backward 
caste Patel) 
Chairman 
nominated by the 
Sarpanch.  
TJP 
Chairman nominated by 
the Sarpanch.  
6 VII PKS (Rajput) Sarpanch himself PKS Sarpanch himself 
7 VIII LM (Brahmin) Sarpanch himself 
Sarpanch is a  ST 
member who is a 
servant in the house of 
the ex-sarpanch LM 
 
LM (he is the real 
power; the de facto 
sarpanch, hence 
continues to be the 
chairman of the WC 
also) 
8 IX SKT (Brahmin) Sarpanch himself 
RLS (a backward caste 
sarpanch controlled by 
the ex-sarpanch SKT 
 
SKT (he is the real 
power; the de facto 
sarpanch, hence 
continues to be the 
chairman of the WC 
also) 
 
9 X 
SLK from ST 
community 
controlled by 
KPT (Brahmin)   
KPT (he is the real 
power; the de facto 
sarpanch, hence 
the chairman of the 
WC also) 
 
Lady member from 
backward caste 
(KPTcontinues to be 
the de facto sarpanch) 
KPT (he is the real 
power; the de facto 
sarpanch, hence 
continues to be the 
chairman of the WC 
also) 
 
10 XI 
BBK from ST 
community 
controlled by 
SSB (Rajput) 
SSB (same position 
as above) 
MPS (Rajput. was rival 
to SSB and defeated 
him to become 
sarpanch. But later, a 
pact was reached 
between them; as a 
result SSB continues to 
be the chairman.) 
SSB  
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11 XII Mrs. HGT 
(Brahmin) 
Mr. HGT (husband 
of the sarpanch: 
the de facto 
sarpanch) 
MDK from ST 
community. Not 
directly under control 
of HGT, but not also in 
the opposition camp. 
 
HGT 
12 XIII 
A backward 
caste sarpanch 
under the control 
of ANM 
(Brahmin) 
ANM (he is the 
real power; the de 
facto sarpanch, 
hence the chairman 
of the WC also) 
Mrs. ANM 
ANM (husband of the 
sarpanch the de facto 
sarpanch) 
13 XIV SS (Rajput) 
RPK (A backward 
caste member 
under the control of 
SS. This is only 
one case when a 
forward caste 
sarpanch did not 
become the 
chairman himself, 
but ensured his 
protégée from a 
backward caste got 
this position. In 
spirit, however, 
sarpanch 
controlled the WC) 
DS (Rajput defeated SS 
in the second term and 
also ensured his ouster 
as the chairman of the 
WC to himself become 
the chairman) 
Sarpanch himself 
 
14 XV 
Sarpanch from 
SC community 
under control of 
RLS (Rajput) 
RLS (he is the real 
power; the de facto 
sarpanch, hence 
the chairman of the 
WC also) 
Sarpanch from ST 
community under 
control of RLS 
RLS (he is the real 
power; the de facto 
sarpanch, hence 
continues to be the 
chairman of the WC) 
15 XVI SRS (Rajput) Sarpanch himself TRS (member of the 
family of SRS) 
SRS (the de facto 
sarpanch) 
16 XVII, XVIII and XIX ?  
JRS (only case of 
competition due to 
involvement of 
three panchayats.)  
Mrs. JRS (de facto 
sarpanch is her 
husband JRS) 
 
Mrs. JRS (de facto 
sarpanch is her 
husband JRS) 
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Annex B 
Distribution of EAS resources to panchayats, Block A1, District 1(95-99) 
 
Amt. 
'00,000 
 
Pan. 
code  
97 
Amt. 
98 
Amt. 
99 
Amt. 
Tot. 
Pan. 
Tot. Amt. 
 
Above 10     3 35.43 
 32 2.66 0 9.9  12.56 
 23 7.8 4.48 0  12.28 
 2* 7.74 2.85 0  10.59 
5--10     19 132.70 
 47 0 0 9.9  9.9 
 5 0 0 9.9  9.9 
 37 0 0 9.9  9.9 
 44 0 0 9.9  9.9 
 26 0 0 9  9 
 33 0 0 8.99  8.99 
 24 0 0 8.98  8.98 
 25 0 0 8.18  8.18 
 43 2.25 2.95 2.89  8.09 
 7 0 0 8  8 
 35 0 0 8  8 
 10 7.67 0 0  7.67 
 41 0 0 7.4  7.4 
 46 3.5 0 3.5  7 
 45 0 0 6.3  6.3 
 42 0 5.49 0  5.49 
3 to 5     6 26.43 
 39 0 0 4.98  4.98 
 18 0 4.88 0  4.88 
 8 0 0 4.72  4.72 
 6 0 4.7 0  4.7 
 38 0 0 4  4 
 40 0 3.15 0  3.15 
0 to 3     21 43.86 
 1* 2.99 0 0  2.99 
 31 0 2.99 0  2.99 
 3* 0 2.99 0  2.99 
 12 2.97 0 0  2.97 
 30 2.97 0 0  2.97 
 16 2.96 0 0  2.96 
 22 0 2.95 0  2.95 
 11 0 2.91 0  2.91 
 20 2.85 0 0  2.85 
 27 0 2.73 0  2.73 
 19 0 2.28 0  2.28 
 17 2.25 0 0  2.25 
 28 0 2.23 0  2.23 
 15 2.2 0 0  2.2 
 36 0 0 2.17  2.17 
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 21 1.18 0 0  1.18 
 14 0 1.14 0  1.14 
 9 0 1.1 0  1.1 
 13** 0 0 0  0 
 29** 0 0 0  0 
 34** 0 0 0  0 
Nil Rest 53 
panchayats 
0 0 0 53 0 
G.Total  51.99 49.82 136.61 99 238.42 
 
                                                                                        
*Research Panchayat. It will be evident from the Table that Panchyat 2, one of the research panchayats, is in 
the highest bracket (above Rs.1 million). The Table shows that in the year 1997, scheme worth Rs.0.774 million 
had come to this panchayat. This was a road scheme. How was its sanction managed was ethnographically 
investigated. It is about this scheme that the ex sarpanch gave a detailed account of different political 
machinations that was employed to get it to the panchayat.  
 
**These panchayats had received no resources under EAS. But their names had appeared on the official 
sanction register from which these data have been compiled. So recheck is needed. If it is confirmed that they 
had received nil resource, that will increase the number of panchayats with nil resource from 53 to 56.  
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